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Enacting is Enough
Commentary on Dave Ward’s The Agent in Magenta
Abstract

In the action-space account of color, an emphasis is laid on
implicit knowledge when it comes to experience, and explanatory
ambitions are expressed. If the knowledge claims are interpreted in a
strong way, the action-space account becomes a form of conservative
enactivism, which is a kind of cognitivism. Only if the knowledge
claims are weakly interpreted, the action space-account can be seen as
a distinctive form of enactivism, but then all reductive explanatory
ambitions must be abandoned.

Erik Myin1
Universiteit Antwerpen
Daniel D. Hutto2
University of Hertfordshire

1. The Action-Space Account as an Explanatory Theory of
Color Experience
The core of “The Agent in Magenta,” consists in the promotion of the actionspace account of color consciousness over that of the sensorimotor contingency
theory. Despite other important differences, both views agree in placing primary
emphasis on implicit knowledge when it comes to experience3. The former focuses on
how such knowledge matters to understanding the consequences that experience has
for action while the latter focuses on the consequences actions have for perception. In
stressing this, the action-space account can be interpreted as a version of conservative
enactivism with explanatory ambitions. Conservative (as opposed, to radical versions
of enactivism, on which we’ll expand below) are precisely those that make essential
appeal to mediating knowledge when it comes to understanding the basis of
experience.
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The action-space account falls into this category because it defends the idea that color
experiences can be explained in terms of implicit knowledge relating to abilities such
as the ability to sort, sift and track colored things, which are in turn grounded in and
enabled by abilities to discriminate colors from each other. Our proclivities to
discriminate colors from each other can be charted via standard psychophysical
procedures by constructing a space in which all discriminable color stimuli are
ordered in terms of their relations of experienced similarity. As such, this space can
be said to characterize our discriminative abilities – that is its geometry is “dictated
by the extent of a perceiver’s sensitivity to similarities and differences to its
constituent shades” (p. 8).
The action-space account holds that implicit knowledge of the enabled
abilities in question provides an explanatory basis, by which it seeks to explicate the
content and character of color appearances in terms of a “more basic account” (p. 19).
It is repeatedly emphasized that the explanatory weight is to be carried by appeals to
“implicit knowledge,” an “understanding,” or an “implicit grasp” of the possibilities
of our discriminative abilities, via a grasping of the totality of relations in which
colors stand to each other. In short:
Action-space theorists (...) claim that an agent’s experiences of color are
explained by her implicit knowledge that a certain range of discriminatory abilities is
enabled for her. The enabling of these abilities constitutes her occupying a specific
point in a complex space of possible enabled discriminatory abilities, the geometry
of which is given by the totality of similarity and difference relations obtaining
between colors to which the perceiver is sensitive (p. 9).

We think it is right for the action-space account to lay emphasis on the role
experiences play in enabling further actions. This locates experience where it belongs
– namely, in the “active lives” of experiencers (to borrow a phrase from Noë (2004)).
Nevertheless, the appeals made to implicit knowledge by defenders of the actionspace account are either unclear or problematic.
It is not clear how we should understand the claim that color experience can
be explained by implicit knowledge that a certain range of abilities is enabled. Part of
the trouble concerns what is meant by ‘explained’ here. Leaving that aside, how
should we understand the claim that an agent has implicit knowledge that a certain
range of abilities is enabled? Prima facie, it might mean that the agent (or its brain)
represents these possibilities at some level – that is its know-how is encoded in an
information base of some sort – perhaps not in a way that is consciously accessible.
Accordingly, use of this sort of knowledge is causally responsible and hence explains
experience. Let us call this the strong reading. A weaker reading is also possible.
Color experiences might simply be explained by the fact that certain abilities are in
fact exercised and that this in some sense constitutes the exhibition of implicit
knowledge. Under this reading, these abilities have a certain structure, but
“knowledge about this structure” fades into the background in that it is not causally
responsible for generating experiences. Let us start by discussing this weak reading.
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1.1. The Weak Reading:
According to the weak reading, color looks are explained by enabled abilities
to discriminate colors from one another. Such discriminations are structured in ways
that can be described by a psychophysical color space (this use of psychophysics has
been admirably explored philosophically by Austen Clark (1993)).
But how does this connect with the idea that discriminative abilities are
enabled? To say that a discriminatory ability is enabled can only mean that actual
discrimination is possible. Well, it is certainly true that, when seeing a color, one must
discriminate it from other colors surrounding it – otherwise one would not see it.4
And it is also true that one could discriminate it from a great number of other colors –
or other colored backgrounds— had they been present instead of the actual one.
Indeed it is the more global ability to discriminate a color from a multiplicity of other
colors that gets characterized by the standard psychophysical methods, which lead to
the psychophysical color discrimination spaces. Such space can indeed be said to
characterize the color discrimination abilities of average human subjects (or of
specific persons, if constructed on an individual basis). However, such a
psychophysical space should be understood for what it is: A purely descriptive device
that compactly orders large amounts of data about perceptual discriminations, as
elicited from subjects under highly constrained conditions. Psychophysics starts with
subjects capable of enjoying certain kinds of perceptual experiences, sets up highly
constrained environments, and a highly constrained task (“Say if you can discriminate
this patch from that patch, or that background”), and offers a means of ordering the
totality of these discriminative reactions. Psychophysics, and the multidimensional
sensory spaces that result from it, are merely ways of depicting the logic of color
judgments and the experiences (as elicited in a highly constrained context) on which
those discriminative judgments are based. A psychophysical space compacts – brings
together in one abstract place – a series of judgments over time.
Thus it makes explicit a structure that is already present in color experiences
and judgments. Therefore, it could not constitute a “more basic account” that
“reductively explains” the structure of experience, let alone the experiences
themselves. So it seems that, if we stick to the weak reading, strong reductive claims
must be abandoned.
If the psychophysical space itself is merely descriptive, perhaps it gains
explanatory power by being grasped, or known, or represented, albeit implicitly?
Before we investigate that option, one more remark should be made regarding
the relation of the psychophysical color space to actual experience. Undoubtedly, the
psychophysical color space tracks important aspects of color experience: how colors
relate to each other in terms of experienced similarity. It is a further step, however, to
treat this characterization as the canonical characterization of color experience – a full
“account of color experience in its full richness” – and to assume that the
characterization provided by a psychophysical similarity space provides a complete or
exhaustive description of color experience. Consider that one could also construct, as
4
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one possibility among an innumerable list of possibilities, a psychophysical space of
the relative similarities among colors and sounds (one could ask which sounds are
more or less similar to a certain color). Certainly, such a space, which might be
different for every different individual, would tell us something about color
experience, and its structure, too. Are there any principled reasons to discount such a
space as being less relevant to a proper “account of color experience”?

1.2. The Strong Reading
On the strong reading, it is not the enabled abilities themselves, but rather the
implicit knowledge that these abilities are enabled, that is meant to carry the
explanatory weight. What kind of knowledge is this? What grounds do we have for
supposing that we genuinely have such knowledge? (See Hutto (2005) for a criticism
of this sort of appeal to implicit knowledge by proponents of the sensorimotor view.
Since Ward’s defense of the action-space account makes the same sort of appeal, the
same criticisms apply). How should we understand the claim that “the knowledge
that these abilities are enabled explains color looks”? On a substantive reading, it
must mean that actually grasping or knowing these possibilities at some level is
responsible for the having of certain kinds of experiences. The content of this
knowledge must pertain to the enabled abilities. If it were expressed in words, it
would amount to a description of the relevant possibilities for action – perhaps, as sets
of rules. Thus it would chart these in just the way that psychophysics charts the
similarity space. Very roughly, an example of such an item of knowledge, if captured
in English, would probably sound something like:
“I see color X, because I could discriminate it from all the other color patches,
and I can discriminate it in a way dictated by its place in this three-dimensional color
space.”
If explicitly represented as such this would amount to a kind of
metaknowledge about one’s abilities and proclivities to discriminate colors. Is
something of this sort being posited by proponents of the “action-space” account (it is
described as self-understanding on p. 19)? The idea that such knowledge is the
subpersonal basis for having experiences is underlined at many points in the paper. In
the words of its author:
According to the action-space view, an after-image or neuroscientifically
induced flash suffices to give a perceiver knowledge of a color since the perceiver
automatically and implicitly grasps both its place in a network of similar and
different colors, and the discriminatory and other abilities that are enabled in virtue
of this.” (p. 18).

It is quite uncertain, however, whether the content corresponding to such a
description exists at all in the heads of agents. Where is the evidence for the existence
of such contents? There is certainly no indication that this content actually ‘occurs’ in
our minds at any level, whenever colors are experienced. Certainly, it does not occur
‘before our mind’s eye.’
Moreover, if, as it seems, this sort of knowledge is meant to explain
experiential looks, then what we have here is the picture of the causal generation of
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experience out of experience-free processes, as if experiences were additional
processes of mental or phenomenal activity that need to be causally generated.
Unless these aspects of the action-space account can be satisfactorily dealt
with, the most promising strategy for its defenders would be to let go of the strong
claim that the knowledge in question is substantive. Speaking of knowledge might
merely be a way of saying that the agent has certain discriminative abilities which,
when studied over a large stretch of time, show a certain pattern. That would take us
back to the weak reading, which, as we argued above, is descriptive, rather than
reductively explanatory.

2. A Distinctive Enactivism
Surrendering the strong interpretation and the aim of reductive explanation in
terms of a more basic account does not diminish the value of the core idea behind the
action-space account of color experience, or perceptual experience in general. On the
contrary, it can bring out what is truly distinctive about this sort of enactivism when
compared with standard offerings of a more traditional cognitivist and reductive bent.
It is to avoid just such problems that we advocate a version of radical
enactivism (see Hutto (2005); also Myin and De Nul (2006) for the beginnings of a
construal of the sensorimotor contingency theory along radical enactivist lines).
According to radical enactivism, to be perceptually aware is just a matter of
exercising perceptual abilities. The radical enactivist endorses the idea that perceptual
experience is constituted by temporally extended interactions between creatures and
aspects of the world. Accordingly, perceptual consciousness is best understood as a
kind of environmentally situated organismic activity. Radical enactivists deny the
view that experiences are inner events or states of mind and that consciousness
depends on a subject’s having mental acquaintance with the special properties of such
inner happenings. Rather, subjective experiences are identified with environmentally
embedded, temporally and spatially extended activities and worldly interactions of
organisms. It is the specific nature of such interactions that decide the phenomenal
character of token acts of experiencing. Experiencing is a world-relating, intentional
activity that incorporates aspects of an organism’s brain, body and environment. From
this description it can be seen that the emphasis in radical enactivism is on the activity
itself, rather than the inner events that enable such activities, let alone on the
activation of knowledge concerning such activities. Radical enactivism should not be
mistaken for a behavioristic identification of experience with outer actions. For it
distinctively lays a fundamental emphasis on the aspect of enacting: It is by engaging
in certain, perhaps complex, forms of activities of perceiving that you perceive. Being
experientially aware just is enacting5. Perceptual experience, conscious perception, in
other words belongs to the realm of acting in a broad sense – including being acted
upon. It is in this broad sense, in the sense that “experience is realized in the active
life” of perceivers’ (Noë, 2004, p. 227), that experience “is something we do”
(O’Regan & Noë, 2001, p. 960, p. 970), (Noë, 2004, p. 1). Radical enactivism, as a
stance towards consciousness, and thus perceptual awareness, is opposed to a
cognitivist identification of perceptual awareness with any variety of inner act of
apprehension or representation (where the latter is understood as standing in relation
5
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to some kind of content). Read under the auspices of the strong interpretation, the
action-space account comes dangerously close to being just another variant of
cognitivism, albeit one in which the cognitive or representational processes that
“account for” experience carry action related-content (for this kind of explicitly
cognitivist rendering of enactivism, see Prinz (2009)).
By contrast, it is the emphasis on equating experience with enacting that
separates radical enactivism from those accounts that attempt to reductively explain
perceptual awareness. For a reductive explanation of perceptual awareness, one would
seek to account for the occurrence of perceptual awareness in terms of some more
basic process, mechanism or property that somehow gives rise to perceptual
awareness. Radical enactivists see that aim as futile: it is by actually carrying out
one’s perceptual abilities that there is perceptual awareness. Though all kinds of more
basic events occur while you engage in these activities, none of those by itself
reductively explains consciousness6.
This applies in a straightforward way to the case of color. A radical enactivist
can happily embrace what was called the weak reading discussed above, with one
important caveat: One experiences color because certain abilities are not only enabled
but appropriately exercised, in the sense of actually enacted. A radical enactivist also
embraces the idea that the abilities are stretched out over time: Our abilities with
respect to experiencing color amount to more than what one does at any single
moment. Radical enactivists resist the inclination to compress this temporally
extended process into one that occurs instantaneously in the mind. Such compression
of an ability into a moment – that is in which it is immediately and implicitly
“grasped” in its entirety— is an unmotivated and unnecessary move. No additional
explanatory leverage is provided by assuming – without evidence – that color
experience is based on the additional, instantaneous grasp of the implicit knowledge
of one’s chromatic abilities (whatever that might mean exactly). Radical enactivism
provides a substantial and liberating contribution to our understanding of perceptual
consciousness precisely because it provides a conception of experience in which the
superfluousness of such a move becomes visible. Enaction is enough – for color
experience and for perceptual awareness in general.
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